Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

Denial of Coverage For Bodily Injury After Policy Period Does Not Violate Public Policy

May 12, 2016 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed that the insurer had no coverage obligations for bodily injury occurring after the policy had been canceled. Hoesen v. Lloyd's of London, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 41 (R.I. March 24, 2016). The plaintiff, Mark Van Hoesen, was seriously injured on July 23, 2012, when he fell from a deck of his house. He sued his contractor, Brian Leonard, alleging that the deck had been negligently constructed. Lloyd's, Leonard's insurer, was later named as a defendant. Lloyd's admitted it issued the policy to Leonard, but it was cancelled on August 29, 2007. Even if it had not been canceled, the policy had expired long before the injuries alleged in plaintiff's complaint occurred. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

White and Williams LLP Secures Affirmation of Denial to Change Trial Settings Based on Plaintiffs’ Failure to Meet the Texas Causation Standard for Asbestos Cases

July 06, 2020 — Christian Singewald & Rochelle Gumapac - White and Williams LLP
The Delaware Supreme Court, in a rare split opinion, affirmed the trial court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Request to Change Trial Settings in favor of all defendants, including a major automotive manufacturer represented by White and Williams LLP, in a mesothelioma case with a young decedent who had an alleged economic loss claim exceeding $9,000,000, in Shaw v. American Friction, Inc. et al., No. 86, 2019. This decision operates to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims based on their failure to meet Delaware’s strict expert deadlines and establish a prima facie case under Texas law. Plaintiffs’ Complaint invoked the application of Texas substantive law and alleged that multiple manufacturers were negligent and strictly liable for failing to warn the decedent of the alleged dangers posed by the use of asbestos-containing products. Plaintiffs’ alleged asbestos exposures from defendants’ products caused Mr. Shaw’s disease and subsequent death. In 2007, Texas instituted its now well-known causation requirement, which requires the “dose” of asbestos exposure from each defendant’s products to be quantified by an expert. Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765, 773 (Tex. 2007). Prior to decedent’s death, Plaintiffs’ counsel deposed decedent and his father for product identification purposes. During the depositions, Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to obtain the necessary factual information from his clients for an expert to be able to opine as to alleged exposure doses from any defendant’s product. Despite lacking the requisite information for a prima facie case under Texas law, Plaintiffs sought and were given placement in an expedited trial setting, which had strict, defined deadlines. Reprinted courtesy of Christian Singewald, White and Williams LLP and Rochelle Gumapac, White and Williams LLP Mr. Singewald may be contacted at singewaldc@whiteandwilliams.com Ms. Gumapac may be contacted at gumapacr@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Withdrawal of an Admission in California May Shift Costs—Including Attorneys’ Fees—Incurred in Connection with the Withdrawal

January 24, 2018 — Tony Carucci – Real Estate Litigation Blog
Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300, a court may permit a party to withdraw an admission made in response to a request for admission upon noticed motion. The court may only do so, however, “if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that party’s action or defense on the merits.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.300(b). The court may also “impose conditions on the granting of the motion that are just, including, but not limited to . . . (2) An order that the costs of any additional discovery be borne in whole or in part by the party withdrawing or amending the admission.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.300(c). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tony Carucci, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Carucci may be contacted at acarucci@swlaw.com

Construction Costs Must Be Reasonable

May 17, 2021 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
When it comes to proving a construction cost, particularly a cost in dispute, the cost must be REASONABLE. Costs subject to claims must be reasonably incurred and the party incurring the costs must show the costs are reasonable. An example of the burden falling on the contractor to prove the reasonableness of costs is found in government contracting. “[T]here is no presumption that a [government] contractor is entitled to reimbursement ‘simply because it incurred…costs.’” Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Secretary of Army, 973 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Stated differently, a federal contractor is not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness just because it incurs costs. Id. In government contracting, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (known as “FAR”) puts the burden of reasonableness on the contractor that incurred the costs. Id. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole

August 06, 2019 — Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation Strategist
Arkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4] In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com

Liquidated Damages Clause Not Enforced

October 02, 2023 — David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hall & Cook, LLP
A liquidated-damages clause was not enforced in a recent case before the Georgia Court of Appeals. The clause did not contain standard provisions that would normally allow a trial court to enforce the clause as written. As a result, the trial court looked beyond the contract to determine whether the City satisfied the requirements for enforcement of the liquidated-damages clause. Below are the relevant excerpts. City of Brookhaven v. Multiplex, LLC, A23A0843, 2023 WL 4779591 (Ga. Ct. App. July 27, 2023) Here, the Contract provides for “Liquidated Damages at the rate of $1,000.00 per calendar day” in the last paragraph of the Scope of Work addendum. The Contract lacks, however, any language indicating that the liquidated damages were not intended to be a penalty. See Fuqua Const. Co. v. Pillar Dev., Inc., 293 Ga. App. 462, 466, 667 S.E.2d 633 (2008) (rejecting use of parol evidence where the parties “explicitly agreed” in “unambiguous contract language” that the liquidated damages were not a penalty). Absent such language, the court can look to parol evidence in the record to determine the effect the provision was intended to have. See J.P. Carey Enterprises, 361 Ga. App. at 391-392 (1) (b), 864 S.E.2d 588 (looking to “extrinsic evidence” such as emails, documents, and deposition testimony to determine whether the damages provision at issue was a penalty); see also Gwinnett Clinic, Ltd. v. Boaten, 340 Ga. App. 598, 602-603, 798 S.E.2d 110 (2017) (“Shah’s testimony also suggested that one purpose of the liquidated damages provision was to deter employees from breaching the agreement”). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hall & Cook, LLP
Mr. Cook may be contacted at cook@ahclaw.com

Blackstone Suffers Court Setback in Irish Real Estate Drama

August 20, 2014 — Donal Griffin and Dara Doyle – Bloomberg
At 11:15 a.m. on July 29, Irish property developer Michael O’Flynn realized that Blackstone Group LP (BX) was trying to gain control of his real estate empire, which includes the country’s tallest residential tower. Ten weeks earlier, the private equity firm had bought 1.8 billion euros ($2.4 billion) of loans to O’Flynn’s companies and the developer personally. Coming out of a meeting, he learned Blackstone was demanding the immediate repayment of 16 million euros of personal loans secured on his shareholdings -- even though he wasn’t in default. By the end of the day he had lost control of the business he’d spent more than 30 years building. “I was shocked that they’d made this demand,” O’Flynn, 57, said in an interview. “It took time to understand the gravity of it because I’ve never been served with a demand in my 36 years of business. I was very recently transferred to Blackstone and I was doing my damnedest to work with them.” Mr. Doyle may be contacted at ddoyle1@bloomberg.net; Mr. Griffin may be contacted at dgriffin10@bloomberg.net Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Donal Griffin and Dara Doyle, Bloomberg

Flooded Courtroom May be Due to Construction Defect

September 01, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The General Services Administration wouldn’t pin it on a construction defect, but a spokesperson said that a pipe that was misaligned during installation was the likely cause of a flood in the Thomas F. Eagleton US Courthouse on August 23. According to the St. Louis Dispatch, the burst pipe caused a 17-story waterfall in the courthouse, soaking ceilings and floors, and drenching the building’s contents.

The building was dedicated eleven years ago. During the nearly ten years before the building was complete, there were construction disputes and soil contamination issues.

Read the full story…

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES