VOSH Jumps Into the Employee Misclassification Pool
July 30, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsThe proper classification of workers by construction companies has been on the radar of the Department of Labor for both the US and Virginia governments for quite a while. While most of the misclassification is innocent and not done to create issues, there have been enough instances of purposeful misclassification of certain workers as independent contractors (thus avoiding workers comp and other payroll expenses) that innocent contractors have born the brunt of these issues through increased payroll costs over those that misclassify (in the form of necessarily higher bids, higher overhead, etc.).
As an additional deterrent to improper classification of workers, the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry has issued guidelines for what will occur in Virginia Department of Safety and Health (VOSH) cases.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
CAUTION: Terms of CCP Section 998 Offers to Compromise Must Be Fully Contained in the Offer Itself
May 12, 2016 —
Jesse M. Sullivan & R. Bryan Martin – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Sanford v. Rasnick, (Ct. of Appeal, 1st App. Dist., No. A145704) the First Appellate District addressed whether a CCP § 998 Offer to Compromise requiring plaintiff to execute a release and enter into a separate settlement agreement was valid. Because the settlement agreement could potentially contain additional terms not stated in the CCP 998 Offer, the Court of Appeal held that it was not.
Plaintiff alleged he was injured when the 17-year-old Defendant ran a stop sign and struck his motorcycle. Plaintiff sued the 17-year-old and his father (the owner of the vehicle) for vehicular negligence and general negligence.
Just after discovery closed, defendants jointly served a CCP § 998 Offer to Compromise to plaintiff in the amount of $130,000. The offer contained a condition requiring that in order to accept, plaintiff must provide a “notarized execution and transmittal of a written settlement agreement and general release. Each party will bear its own fees, costs and expenses.”
Mr. Sullivan may be contacted at jsullivan@hbblaw.com
Mr. Martin may be contacted at bmartin@hbblaw.com
Reprinted courtesy of
Jesse M. Sullivan, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
R. Bryan Martin, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
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Understanding Liability Insurer’s Two Duties: To Defend and to Indemnify
December 26, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA liability insurer has two duties that are the crux of a liability policy: the duty to defend the insured in legal actions and the duty to indemnify the insured from losses covered under the policy. Many times, policyholders (insureds) do not fully understand or appreciate these two important duties. They need to and this is why having private counsel assist with coverage-related considerations is an absolute must.
An insurers’ duty to defend is separate from its duty to indemnify. A recent opinion out of the Middle District of Florida in Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Tate Transport Corp., 2022 WL 16963815 (M.D.Fla. 2022) clarifies the distinction between these duties with a focus on an insurer’s initial duty — the duty to defend. Please read below so you can have more of an appreciation of these duties. The court does a good job discussing Florida law with the emphasis on when an insurer’s initial duty to defend kicks-in:
Duty to Defend
Under Florida law, “an insurer’s duty to defend its insured against a legal action arises when the complaint alleges facts that fairly and potentially bring the suit within policy coverage.” The duty to defend is a broad one, broader than the duty to indemnify, and “[t]he merits of the underlying suit are irrelevant.” We determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured based only on “the eight corners of the complaint and the policy,” and only as the complaint’s alleged facts are “fairly read[.]” The “facts” we consider in evaluating the duty to defend come solely from the complaint, regardless of the actual facts of the case and regardless of any later developed and contradictory factual record. “Any doubts regarding
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Coronavirus and Contract Obligations
March 30, 2020 —
David R. Cook - AHC Construction and Procurement BlogThe Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has caused a global disruption to businesses, causing many to temporarily close and lay off employees. As businesses assess the short– and long–term economic impact of COVID-19, they should also evaluate what contractual obligations and remedies are available under various agreements (e.g., leases, vendor agreements, and supply agreements). When performance may be delayed or may not occur altogether, businesses should consider their force majeure clauses, if any, and the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose.
Force Majeure
Generally, unless a contract provides that performance will be suspended or relieved when certain events occur (e.g., “acts of God,” government regulation, acts of war or terror, strikes), each party is obligated to perform. However, when there is an express force majeure provision, certain events or acts may excuse non-performance or delayed performance. But depending on the jurisdiction, courts may construe force majeure provisions narrowly and excuse performance only for those events expressly listed in the clause. Nonetheless, if the force majeure provision includes pandemic, epidemic, quarantine, government act, disease, or similar terms, then the COVID-19 pandemic may excuse performance or allow delayed performance.
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David R. Cook, Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case
May 26, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFA three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.
The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“
On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:
“The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”
On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”
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Midview Board of Education Lawsuit Over Construction Defect Repairs
February 04, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFMidview Local Schools Board of Education in Grafton, Ohio, “filed a lawsuit asking Lorain County Common Pleas Court to order the Ohio School Facilities Commission to help pay for repairs on three new schools,” according to The Morning Journal. Scott Goggin, Midview’s Superintendent, told The Morning Journal: “Water-stained ceilings and weeping windows in three new elementary schools, built with financial help and cooperation of the OSFC Expedited Local Partnership Program, irritated the district for months.”
“The lawsuit,” as reported by The Morning Journal “claimed other school districts received financial help from the state when correcting repairs to their schools built through the same program.” Furthermore, the lawsuit stated that “OSFC failed to assess the total classroom facilities needs of the school district, and to share the costs of repairing defects.”
The Morning Journal reported, “The lawsuit asks for restitution of the state’s share of correcting the construction defects, the costs of the lawsuit and reasonable attorney’s fees, and further relief the court decides is just and fair.”
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Saved By The Statute: The Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Bar Claims Under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
May 10, 2021 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Earl v. NVR, Inc., No. 20-2109, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6451, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) considered whether, under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) claims against the builder of her home were barred by the economic loss doctrine. The UTPCPL is a Pennsylvania statute that prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-3. The Third Circuit previously addressed the impact of the economic loss doctrine on UTPCPL claims in Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 2002). In Werwinski, the court held that the plaintiff’s UTPCPL claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine. The Court of Appeals overturned its decision in Werwinski and held that the economic loss doctrine does not bar UTPCPL claims since such claims are statutory, and not based in tort.
In Earl, the plaintiff, Lisa Earl, entered into an agreement with defendant NVR, Inc. (NVR) for the construction and sale of a home in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Ms. Earl learned of the home through NVR’s marketing, which described the home as containing “quality architecture, timeless design, and beautiful finishes.” Ms. Earl alleged that during the construction of the home, she had further discussions with agents of NVR, who made representations that the home would be constructed in a good and workmanlike manner and that any deficiencies noted by Ms. Earl would be remedied. The defendant also assured Ms. Earl that the home would be constructed in accordance with relevant building codes and industry standards. After moving into the home, Ms. Earl discovered several material defects in the construction. She provided notice of these defects to NVR, but NVR’s attempts to repair some of the defects were inadequate.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Subcontractors Have a Duty to Clarify Ambiguities in Bid Documents
August 19, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorSeveral months ago, I wrote about an escalator subcontractor that sued a general contractor, demanding payment for work completed based on approved shop drawings. The trial court agreed with the subcontractor, but the general contractor appealed. Ten months later, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the subcontractor had a duty to bring to the general contractor’s attention major discrepancies or errors they detect in the bid documents.
“The subcontractor failed to disclose ambiguities in the plans and must suffer the peril.”
Construction Difficulties
The subcontractor installed 32 inch escalators throughout the project, but the plans called for 40 inch escalators. The general contractor and subcontractor could not reach agreement on how the dispute should be resolved. The subcontractor sued the general to get paid for replacing the escalators and the general sued to subcontractor for concessions it had to pay to the owner.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
