Attorneys’ Fees Are Available in Arizona Eviction Actions
December 19, 2018 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogThe Arizona Court of Appeals recently held that any successful plaintiff in a forcible detainer action (i.e., an eviction action) may recover an award of its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred at trial under A.R.S. § 12-1178(A). See Bank of New York v. Dodev, 1 CA-CV 17-0652 (Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2018). Prior to this decision, caselaw held that fees were only awardable in actions arising out of the termination of a residential lease. RREEF Mgmt. Co. v. Camex Prods., Inc., 190 Ariz. 75, 945 P.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1997). Changes to the statute, however, rendered the prior caselaw obsolete. Although the holding in Dodev is important, the facts of the case are truly astonishing…and somewhat depressing.
The Facts
In Dodev, Ivaylo Dodev (Dodev) defaulted on his home loan in 2008. He nevertheless “succeeded in remaining on the [p]roperty by filing numerous legal actions that delayed the foreclosure and subsequent trustee’s sale” at least through the date of the opinion—a ten (10) year period.
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Ben Reeves, Snell & WilmerMr. Reeves may be contacted at
breeves@swlaw.com
Construction Defects Not Occurrences under Ohio Law
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFConcluding the “claims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property owners are not claims for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ under a commercial general liability policy,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled in Westfield Insurance Co. v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc. In the underlying case, Custom Agri Systems, Inc. built a grain bin as a subcontractor to Younglove Construction, LLC. Younglove had been contracted by PSD Development, which withheld payment, claiming it had suffered damages due to defects in Custom Agri System’s work. Younglove filed a complaint against Custom Agri, which filed complaints against its subcontractors. Custom Agri also requested that its insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, defend and indemnify it. Westfield claimed that it had no such duty. The Ohio Supreme Court concurred.
The decision notes that “Custom was being sued under two general theories: defective construction and consequential damages resulting from the defective construction.” Westfield argued that none of the claims were “for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence” and therefore none of the claims were covered under the CGL policy.” Further, Westfield argued that “even if the claims were for property damage caused by an occurrence, they were removed from coverage by an exclusion in the policy.”
The case was filed in the US District Court which issued a summary judgment for Westfield. The plaintiff appealed and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The court noted that “all of the claims against which Westfield is being asked to defect and indemnify Custom relate to Custom’s work itself.” And so, the court concluded that they “must decide whether Custom’s alleged defective construction of and workmanship on the steel grain bin constitute property damage caused by an ‘occurrence.’” However, the court noted that under the terms of the insurance contract, an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” and the court noted that the “natural and commonly accepted meaning” of “accident” is something “unexpected, as well as unintended.”
The Ohio Supreme Court also looked at court decisions in other places, and found that in many similar cases, courts have concluded that construction defects are not occurrences.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Pfeifer argues that “if the defective construction is accidental, it constitutes an ‘occurrence’ under a CGL policy.” Justice Pfeifer characterized the majority’s definition of “accidental” as “broad, covering unexpected, unintentional happenings.”
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The ABCs of PFAS: What You Need to Know About Liabilities for the “Forever Chemical”
February 22, 2021 —
Robert F. Walsh, Gregory S. Capps & R. Victoria Fuller - Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterThis article is based on a presentation the authors made at White and Williams LLP’s Virtual Coverage College® on October 22, 2020. Every year, hundreds of insurance professionals come to Philadelphia—this year via our online platform—to participate in a full day of lectures and interactive presentations by White and Williams lawyers and guest panelists about the latest issues and challenges involved in claim handling and insurance litigation. Visit coveragecollege.com for more information and stay tuned for Coverage College® 2021.
Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances, commonly referred to as PFAS or PFOS, have been a key ingredient in numerous industrial and consumer products for decades. These man-made chemicals are prevalent and are also known for their longevity in the environment. More recently, PFAS have been the focus of thousands of lawsuits alleging personal injury and property damage. Some insurers have already questioned whether PFAS could rival asbestos in scope and bottom-line impacts. It is a legacy that confronts manufacturers and other defendants and insurers today.
This article provides a primer on PFAS, including the current regulatory framework and litigation landscape. We also identify some key emerging coverage issues insurers should be aware of when dealing with PFAS claims under liability and first-party property policies.
Reprinted courtesy of
Robert F. Walsh, White and Williams LLP and
Gregory S. Capps, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Walsh may be contacted at walshr@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Capps may be contacted at cappsg@whiteandwilliams.com
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EPA Coal Ash Cleanup Rule Changes Send Utilities, Agencies Back to Drawing Board
February 21, 2022 —
Corinne Grinapol - Engineering News-RecordThe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency plans to deny requests by three power facilities for extended deadlines to close unlined coal ash impoundments that are risks to groundwater, while offering only a provisional extension to another. The decision came as part of a larger agency push to strengthen regulation of coal combustion residuals disposal and facilities with unlined storage.
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Corinne Grinapol, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com
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Insurer Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Water Damage Claims
January 22, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIssues of fact surrounding the applicability of various exclusions prevented the insurer from securing summary judgment on claims for water damage. Babai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175336 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 13, 2013).
The insured noticed water damage to various areas of her home during remodeling. Allstate denied the claim because the loss was "not sudden and accidental," but rather progressive. Allstate cited the policy provision for "wear and tear, aging, . . . deterioration," etc., to exclude coverage.
Plaintiff filed suit and Allstate moved for summary judgment. First, Allstate argued that construction defects were excluded from coverage based upon the exclusion for "latent defects." "Latent defects" were those that would not be discovered by a reasonable person. There was no evidence that the water damage was readily discoverable, so Allstate's argument failed.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
AECOM Out as General Contractor on $1.6B MSG Sphere in Las Vegas
January 18, 2021 —
Doug Puppel - Engineering News-RecordDevelopers of the $1.66-billion MSG Sphere in Las Vegas have removed AECOM as general contractor on the project and will bring construction management in-house for the 875,000-sq-ft entertainment venue, according to a Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. statement released Dec. 17.
Reprinted courtesy of
Doug Puppel, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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“To Indemnify, or Not to Indemnify, that is the Question: California Court of Appeal Addresses Active Negligence in Indemnity Provisions”
April 05, 2017 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic & Omar Parra – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn California, it is well-established that the extent of a party’s obligation under an indemnity agreement is an issue of contractual interpretation, and it is therefore the intent of the parties that should control. What is the parties’ intent, then, when a subcontractor (indemnitor) agrees to indemnify the general contractor (indemnitee) “except to the extent the claims arise out of the general contractor’s active negligence or willful misconduct”? Does this mean the general contractor is barred entirely from recovering any indemnity if its active negligence contributed to the injury? Not according to the First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal, which recently held that an actively negligent general contractor may still recover indemnity for the portion of liability attributable to the fault of others. Oltmans Construction Co. v. Bayside Interiors, Inc., No. A147313, 2017 WL 1179391, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2017).
In Oltmans Construction, an employee of O’Donnell Plastering, Inc. (“O’Donnell”), a sub-subcontractor of Bayside Interiors, Inc. (“Bayside”), which was a subcontractor to Oltmans Construction Company (“Oltmans”), sustained injuries when he fell through a skylight opening in the roof of a building under construction. The employee filed suit against Bayside, Oltmans, and the building’s owner, arguing Oltmans negligently cut and left unsecured the skylight opening. Oltmans subsequently filed a Cross-Complaint against Bayside and O’Donnell, contending it was entitled to indemnification under the governing agreements.
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Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Omar Parra, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com
Mr. Parra may be contacted at oparra@hbblaw.com
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CA Supreme Court Permits Insurers to Bring Direct Actions Seeking Reimbursement of Excessive Fees Against Cumis Counsel Under Limited Circumstances
August 19, 2015 —
David W. Evans & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPThe California Supreme Court held in Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. J.R. Marketing, L.L.C. (Squire Sanders) (8/10/2015 - #S211645) that if Cumis counsel, operating under a court order which such counsel drafted and which expressly provided that the insurer would be able to recover excessive fees, sought and received fee payments from the insurer that were fraudulent or otherwise manifestly and objectively useless and wasteful when incurred, Cumis counsel have been unjustly enriched at the insurer’s expense and the insurer will be permitted under such limited circumstances to seek reimbursement directly from Cumis counsel.
Certain Hartford insureds who had been issued commercial general liability policies were sued in multiple proceedings for a variety of claims, including unfair competition, defamation and intentional misrepresentation. Hartford disclaimed a duty to defend or to indemnify the defendants on the grounds that the acts complained of occurred prior to Hartford’s policy, and that some of the defendants were not Hartford insureds. A coverage action was filed by some of the insureds against Hartford; they were represented by the Squire Sanders law firm. Although Hartford subsequently agreed to defend several of the defendants subject to a reservation of rights, it declined to pay defense expenses incurred prior to the date of such agreement. Some months later, the trial court entered a summary adjudication order, finding that Hartford had a duty to have defended the liability action on the date it was originally tendered; the order required Hartford to fund the insured’s defense with independent counsel (i.e., so-called “Cumis” counsel; see San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358). The insureds retained Squire Sanders as their Cumis counsel.
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David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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